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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright protects written works.1  However, the 1909 Copyright Act (the 
“1909 Act”) only protected published written works, and sometimes, if the first 
written version of a work was registered before it was published, it was an 
incomplete deposit copy.2  Recently, the Ninth Circuit adopted the view that 
the protected work of authorship, in certain cases, should be limited to the work 
expressed in the deposit copy and not in any later publication.3  This comment 
argues, both as a doctrinal matter and practical matter, that this view is 
mistaken. 
In 1831, musical compositions were added to copyright protection in order 
to give “the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition . . . .”4  
Under the 1909 Act, in order to register an unpublished work, one complete 
copy of the work in a legible notation had to be sent to the Copyright Office.5  
 
*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, Marquette University Law School.  The author would like to thank her 
parents for their support.  
1. See What Does Copyright Protect, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE: FAQ’S, 
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-protect.html [https://perma.cc/K2EW-589Z] (last visited Oct. 
31, 2019). 
2. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 24 et seq. (1976)). 
3. See Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). 
4. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). 
5. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 24 et seq. (1976)). 
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The 1909 Act further specified that phonorecords were not accepted as deposit 
copies.6  In 1976, the Copyright Act underwent another major revision that 
eliminated the publication requirement and, as a result, also eliminated the need 
to use a deposit copy as a substitute for publication.7 
One of the problems courts are faced with today is determining what 
happens with unpublished works registered under the 1909 Act: can only the 
sheet music filed with the deposit copy come into evidence when comparing 
two works as substantially similar?  In 2015, the district court in Williams v. 
Gaye addressed the issue; however, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the 
issue on appeal.8  Later in 2018, in Skidmore v. Zeppelin (“Skidmore”), the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that when dealing with unpublished works under the 
1909 Act, the deposit copy defines the scope of the copyright.9  Part I of this 
comment is an overview of the deposit copy requirement under the 1909 Act.  
Part II will address what constitutes a deposit copy.  Part III will address the 
repercussions of Skidmore and how the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in holding 
that the scope of a copyright comes simply from the deposit copy rather than 
the entire musical work. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE DEPOSIT COPY REQUIREMENT UNDER THE 1909 ACT 
As the times have changed, copyright law has adapted.  In 1790, maps, 
charts, and books were protected works.10  In 1802, prints were added; in 1831, 
musical compositions were added; in 1856, dramatic works were added; in 
1865, photographs were added; and in 1870, works of art were added.11  
Furthermore, in 1831, the term of protection was extended, and in 1870, the 
administration of registrations for copyright was moved to the Library of 
Congress Copyright Office.12  In 1909, a major revision took place, expanding 
copyright protections “to include all works of authorship . . . .”13  The 1909 Act 
allowed a work to be protected either through registration and submission of a 
 
6. Id. 
7. General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE A2:08 (Sept. 1977), 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NG7-SJXT]. 
8. See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
9. Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). 
10. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBR., 
https://www.arl.org/copyright-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/94Q3-VV78] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
11. The 19th Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE: TIMELINE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_19th_century.html [https://perma.cc/BHL4-BKU5] (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2019). 
12. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, supra note 10. 
13. Id. 
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deposit copy or through publication.14  Unpublished works were not protected 
under the 1909 Act.15  Only state common law protected unpublished works.16  
However, a copyright owner could constructively publish the work by filing for 
a registration before actual publication,17 which, as you will see, is what 
happened in the cases below.18 
Phonorecords were not accepted as forms of deposit copies of the 
underlying works until the 1976 Copyright Act (the “1976 Act”).19  A 
phonorecord is defined by the Copyright Office as 
 
[a] material object in which sounds are fixed and from which sounds 
can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  A phonorecord may 
include a cassette tape, an LP vinyl disc, a compact disc, or other means 
of fixing sound.  A phonorecord does not include those sounds 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.20 
 
In 1976, the Copyright Act underwent another major revision; 21 this 
revision remains the most current Copyright Act.  The 1976 Act extended the 
term of protection and discussed copyright scope and subject matter of works 
covered, exclusive rights, copyright term, copyright notice, copyright 
registration, copyright infringement, fair use, and defenses and remedies to 
infringement.22  The 1976 Act, differing from the 1909 Act, stated that a 
complete copy or a phonorecord must be sent with the application for an 
unpublished work.23  With the 1976 Act, Congress intended the standards of 
originality and creativity, that had been developed by the courts under the 1909 
Act, to remain the same under the new law.24 
 
14. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. § 24 et seq. (1976)). 
15. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[A][2][c] 
(2019) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See discussion infra. 
19. General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 7, at 3:3. 
20. U.S. Copyright Office Definitions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/definitions.html [https://perma.cc/PFA7-4QF3] (last visited Oct. 
31, 2019). 
21. General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 7, at A2:08. 
22. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, supra note 10. 
23. General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 7, at A2:08. 
24. Id. 
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“[C]opyright law only protects an author’s expression,” not facts and ideas 
within a work.25  In order to prove copyright infringement, two elements must 
be met: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.26  A plaintiff can establish copyright 
infringement by showing either that a defendant had access to the work or that 
the two works are substantially similar in idea and expression of the idea.27 
II.  ARE MUSICAL WORKS LIMITED TO A DEPOSIT COPY OR CAN DEPOSIT 
COPIES EVIDENT OF MUSICAL WORKS INCLUDE OTHER THINGS? 
What the deposit copy was limited to has changed as the Copyright Act has 
changed.  In Williams v. Gaye, the district court held that the 1909 Act protected 
only the sheet music that was deposited with the Copyright Office and not the 
sound recording itself.28  In 1976, Marvin Gaye recorded the song Got to Give 
It Up and deposited six pages of handwritten sheet music with the Copyright 
Office.29  He published the work by filing for a registration before actual 
publication,30 which is known as constructive publication.31  Gaye did not write 
or read sheet music.32  Rather, he hired an unidentified transcriber to notate the 
sheet music.33  Gaye’s song was governed by the 1909 Act.34 
In 2012, Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke wrote Blurred Lines, which, 
in 2013, became the best-selling single in the world.35  The Gaye family claimed 
that the song infringed on Got to Give It Up, and Williams and Thicke sued for 
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.36  The district court held that, since 
only the sheet music was deposited with the Copyright Office, only the sheet 
music was protected.37  The Gayes hired Dr. Ingrid Monson, the Quincy Jones 
Professor of African American Music at Harvard University, and musicologist 
Judith Finell, who argued that “a deposit copy is ‘not intended to represent fully 
 
25. Taylor Turville, Note, Emulating vs. Infringement: The “Blurred Lines” of Copyright Law, 
38 WHITTER L. REV. 199, 201 (2018) (quoting Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 
1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26. Elements of Copyright Infringement, 9 ARIZ. PRAC., BUS. L. DESKBOOK § 15:12 (2018–19 
ed.). 
27. Id. 
28. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). 
29. Id. at 1116. 
30. Id. 
31. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 15, at § 7.16[A][2][c]. 
32. Williams, 895 F.3d at 1116. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1117. 
35. Id. at 1116. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1117. 
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the composition.  At best, it is a skeletal representation or sketch, and usually 
shows only the most basic vocal melodies, typically only a single iteration of 
the beginning sections, some beginning lyrics, and chord indications.’”38  
Further, Finell stated that “lead sheets were notated after the composition was 
completed and recorded, in order to fulfill music copyright registration 
requirements.  They were often notated by music copyists employed by the 
music publishers rather than by the artists themselves.”39  The Gayes argued 
that the scope of a deposit copy should be expanded to include more than just 
the deposit copy itself and include the actual musical work.40  The district court 
held that the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office is what is 
protected.41  The case went up on appeal,42 but the Ninth Circuit declined to 
address the issue of what constitutes a protected work.43 
In 2018, in Skidmore, the plaintiff, Michael Skidmore, brought a copyright 
infringement suit on behalf of the estate of one of the band members of Spirit.44  
Spirit had written the song Taurus in 1966,45 and here, he constructively 
published46 the work by filing his sheet music with the Copyright Office in 
1967.47  Led Zeppelin crossed paths with Spirit on several occasions in the 
1960s and 1970s.48  The Zeppelin band had performed covers of other Spirit 
songs.49  Spirit and Zeppelin even performed at the same concert where Spirit 
played Taurus.50  Skidmore filed suit alleging copyright infringement.51  The 
court held that “[b]ecause the 1909 Act governed the scope of the copyright . . . 
obtained in ‘Taurus’ . . . the protectable copyright was the musical composition 
transcribed in the deposit copy of ‘Taurus’ and not the sound recordings.”52 
 
38. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK, 2014 WL 7877773, *7 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
39. Id. (quoting Declaration of Judith Finell, at ¶ 42, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 
LA CV13-06004 JAK, 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (No. 112-3)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
40. Id. 
41. Williams, 895 F.3d at 1117. 
42. Id. at 1115. 
43. Id. at 1121. 
44. Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
45. Id. at 1122. 
46. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 15, at § 7.16[A][2][c]. 
47. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1122. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 1123. 
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The Ninth Circuit, in Skidmore, addressed the following question: what 
defines the scope of a protectable copyright?53  It held that a deposit copy, rather 
than a sound recording, defines the scope of a protectable copyright.54  The 
court stated that “the structure of the 1909 Act demonstrates that the deposit 
copy encompasses the scope of the copyright for unpublished works, as the 
deposit copy must be filed not only to register the copyright, but for the 
copyright to even exist.”55  The 1909 Act makes a copyright completely 
dependent on a deposit copy.56  Thus, it follows that the deposit copy defines 
the scope of the copyright.  The court further stated that “[i]t was not until the 
1976 Act that common law copyright was federalized and copyright attached 
at the creation of the work.”57  Therefore, the scope of a copyright for any work 
created prior to the 1976 Act is defined only by the deposit copy. 
The Ninth Circuit says the deposit copy defines the scope of the copyright.58  
This is the holding lower courts are left with to apply.  Skidmore, in his brief to 
the court, stated that a deposit copy is purely archival in nature under the 1909 
Act.59  Further, he argued “that the express purpose of the 1909 Act was to 
overturn White-Smith and extend copyright protection beyond sheet music,”60 
relying on section 1(e) from the 1909 Act, which protects “any system of 
notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be 
recorded . . . .”61  However, the Ninth Circuit rejected Skidmore’s argument.62 
I believe Skidmore was correct and that the Ninth Circuit erred by finding 
the deposit copy defines the scope of the copyright under the 1909 Act.  The 
Ninth Circuit failed to adhere to stare decisis and, further, did not consider the 
consequences of its decision.63  To adhere to stare decisis is “to stand by . . .  
and not disturb what is settled.”64 
If left to stand, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will essentially “revoke 
copyright protection for almost all musical compositions created before 1978 
 
53. Id. at 1131. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1134. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1132. 
60. Id. 
61. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. § 24 et seq. (1976)). 
62. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1134. 
63. Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc at 19, Skidmore v. 
Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 74). 
64. Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, at 18 
(quoting In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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. . . .”65  Most songs from 1909 to 1978, excluding classical music, were not 
composed on sheet music.66  Rather, they were composed on instruments.67  The 
sheets that were filed with the Copyright Office were enough to identify the 
songs, but rarely included all of the notes in the song.68  The lead sheets were 
also frequently inaccurate.69 
This is what happened with Taurus and Stairway to Heaven (“Stairway”).  
Stairway was not composed on paper, but rather with instruments.70  The song, 
as found on the Led Zeppelin IV album version, includes 11,000 notes.71  
However, only 400 notes are found on the deposit lead sheet, which means that 
essentially only 3.6% of Stairway is copyrighted under the panel’s decision.72  
Thus, “[t]he panel’s decision creates a discordant copyright scheme, never 
intended by Congress,” where only small bits of songs would have copyright 
protection.73  Songwriters will suffer dire consequences if musical composition 
copyrights are limited to deposit copies.74 
Critics argue that music publishers, “who [have] both expertise in doing so 
and every incentive . . . [to] capture[] . . . the original elements of musical 
compositions,” typically prepare deposit copies.75  They argue that great care is 
taken in preparing deposit copies, especially in Taurus because the deposit copy 
was marked “rev.,” indicating that is was likely revised.76  Critics further argue 
that deposit copies can be brief but can still contain the melody and elements 
of the musical composition intended to be protected.77  However, these are 
inaccurate statements about deposit copies.78  Deposit copies are, oftentimes, 
an insufficient representation of the entire musical composition as shown in the 
example of Stairway’s deposit copy only having 400 notes out of the 11,000 
notes that make up the entire work.79 
 
65. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 19. 
71. Id. at 6. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 20. 
74. See id. at 13. 
75. Response to Appellant Michael Skidmore’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 18, Skidmore 
v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 84). 
76. Response to Appellant Michael Skidmore’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 75, 
at 18–19. 
77. Id. at 19. 
78. See id. at 19–20. 
79. Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, at 6. 
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A trip to the Copyright Office will reveal that many other musical 
monuments are at risk with their minimal protection.  Take, for example, Hotel 
California by the Eagles: “[It] has two 1976 registrations, neither of which has 
the plucked guitar intro or the guitar solos from the studio version.  A 1977 
published version added a piano vocal arrangement with guitar chords.  A 
published version from a 1978 songbook has the intro but still lacks the guitar 
solos.”80  Another example is Free Bird by Lynyrd Skynyrd: “[T]he album 
version[,] . . . which runs more than nine minutes, has an initial deposit copy of 
only eight lines, registered on Dec. 5, 1973.  It contains only lyrics, melody, 
and basic chords.  The only other registration . . . found was a four-page 
published piano arrangement from 1975.”81  American University Law School 
Professor Peter Jaszi says that “[n]o one should assume that solos not reflected 
in the deposit copies of sheet music are necessarily in the public domain . . . .”82  
Mark Jaffe, a copyright lawyer from San Francisco, continues this thought by 
saying that “[but] no one should assume they aren’t . . . .”83 
Critics who agree with the Ninth Circuit argue that only what is contained 
in the deposit copy is protected as a copyrighted work.84  In Bridgeport Music, 
Inc v. UMG Recordings, Inc., the plaintiff claimed copyright in a musical 
composition, but the court refused to recognize copyright in the sheet music 
that the plaintiff later prepared, stating that it was not part of the original 
copyrighted work.85  “Ordinarily, a registration for a work of authorship only 
covers the material that is included in the deposit copy(ies).  It does not cover 
authorship that does not appear in the deposit copy(ies), even if the applicant 
expressly claims that authorship in the application.”86  Further, the critics argue, 
as they did in Skidmore, that only the deposit copy for Taurus is protected, not 
the entire work.87 
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere was cited in both Zeppelin and Skidmore’s 
appellate briefs.88  Upon my review of the case, I believe it states that “an 
 
80. Vernon Silver, The Legal Loophole That May Leave Some of Rock’s Greatest Riffs Up for 
Grabs, BLOOMBERG BUS. WKLY. (June 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2019-
classic-rock-riffs-loophole/ [https://perma.cc/K9TB-FKGC]. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (quoting Professor Peter Jaszi who served on a 1993 Library of Congress committee 
tasked with studying copyright issues) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Bridgeport Music, Inc v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 276 (6th Cir. 2009). 
86. COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 500 (3d ed. 2017). 
87. Response to Appellant Michael Skidmore’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 75, 
at 18–19. 
88. See Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, 
at 3; Response to Appellant Michael Skidmore’s Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 75, at 3. 
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unpublished work” receives federal protection under the 1909 Act, and that 
“under the 1909 Act the existence and scope of a copyright was determined at 
common law, which provided that a composition gained copyright protection 
from the ‘moment of its creation.’”89  A later registration of a copyright merely 
conferred federal protections and jurisdiction on the work, but did not alter the 
existing scope of the copyright.90 
Critics argue that the copyrighted work is the work used in order to 
determine whether an infringement has occurred.91  The copyrighted work 
under the 1909 Act would be the deposit copy that was filed with the Copyright 
Office,92 and critics argue that the deposit copy is what should be used in an 
infringement case, not the entire work.93  Under this theory, anything that is not 
in the deposit copy of a song is not protected.94  To put this into perspective, 
consider Hotel California by the Eagles and the guitar solo at the beginning of 
the song.  The guitar solo does not appear anywhere in the deposit copy.95  Thus, 
under this theory, that famous guitar solo would not be protected and would 
presumptively be in the public domain. 
The Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari and issue an opinion on the 
deposit copy issue, which leaves works created prior to the 1976 Act in 
somewhat of a bind.  I tend to agree with the plaintiff/appellant, Skidmore, in 
this case.  I believe that limiting the scope of copyright to simply the deposit 
copy will have a chilling effect on copyright protection.  As Skidmore pointed 
out in his brief, no appellate court has ever ruled that a deposit copy defines the 
scope of copyright protection.96  Why would a court, almost one hundred years 
after the fact, hold that the deposit copy defines the scope of a protected work? 
Additionally, as Skidmore’s brief also pointed out, most musical 
compositions created before 1978 would lose their copyrighted protection 
because they were composed on instruments, as opposed to sheet music.97  The 
lead sheets that were filed with the Copyright Office for these songs could 
identify the songs but did not encompass the entirety of the work.98  This is 
 
89. Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, at 5 
(emphasis omitted). 
90. Id. 
91. Response to Appellant Michael Skidmore’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 75, 
at 16. 
92. Id. at 9. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. 
95. Silver, supra note 80. 
96. Appellant’s Petition for Limited Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, at 19. 
97. Id. at 5. 
98. Id. 
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exactly what happened with Stairway—as the lead sheet included only 400 
notes—when the entire work was around 11,000 notes.99 
III.  LOOKING FORWARD AFTER SKIDMORE & ANALYZING ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
I believe Congress intended the entirety of a work to be protected, not 
simply a lead sheet.  This intention dates back to the first Copyright Act of 
1790, where the purpose was “to provide incentive to authors, artists, and 
scientists to create original works by providing creators with a monopoly.”100  
Congress wanted works to be protected, and they wanted to incentivize 
creators.101  Thus, holding true with this intention, copyright protection should 
protect the entirety of a work and not simply a lead sheet that has been filed 
with the Copyright Office. 
In Skidmore, the Ninth Circuit also addressed whether the district court 
abused its discretion in precluding the recordings of Taurus from being played, 
and it held that the district court did abuse its discretion.102  Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the district court found that the probative value of the 
evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.103  The 
district court stated that the recordings were relevant, but that the jury would be 
confused by hearing them in order to determine whether the defendant had 
access to the plaintiff’s work.104 
 Federal Rules of Evidence 403 states that a “court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”105  The Ninth Circuit stated that “the district court could have 
instructed the jury that the recordings were limited to the issue of access and 
that they were not to be used to judge substantial similarity.”106  The Ninth 
Circuit further held that the recordings should have come into evidence but be 
limited to the issue of access.107 
The Ninth Circuit seems to think that giving a limiting instruction is 
sufficient, but the problem is that once you ring a bell, you cannot unring it—
 
99. Id. at 6. 
100. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, supra note 10. 
101. Id. 
102. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1131 (9th Cir. 2018). 
103. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
104. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1135. 
105. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
106. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1135. 
107. Id. 
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meaning that once a jury hears the sound recording, they cannot unhear it.  A 
limiting instruction “tells jurors not to use a particular piece of evidence to draw 
a certain inference, although they are free to use the evidence in other ways.”108  
Professor David A. Sklansky puts it best: “There are two well-known facts 
about evidentiary instructions of both varieties.  The first is that our system 
relies heavily on these instructions.  The second is that they do not work.”109  
Courts presume that juries will listen to these limiting instructions, and this is 
presumed to be a “premise upon which our jury system is founded.”110  
Sklansky states that this presumption is “widely acknowledged to be false, a 
kind of professional myth.”111 
The issue of limiting instructions has been prevalent in our society for 
decades but is specifically relevant in regards to the Skidmore decision.  In 
Skidmore, the Ninth Circuit first limited the scope of the copyright protection 
to the deposit copy, 112 which excluded the jury from hearing the sound 
recording of Taurus.  Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
abused its discretion and stated that, in regards to the issue of access, the sound 
recording of Taurus can and should come into evidence; however, the Ninth 
Circuit also stated that the district court could have issued a limiting 
instruction.113  A recording runs the risk of being even more dangerous than 
testimony from another person.  This is the theory in psychology known as 
“thought suppression.”114  Dr. Broda-Bahm wrote an article in which there is a 
picture of a white polar bear at the top.115  She says as you read this post, do not 
think about the white bear.116  Then she goes on to say, “Test subjects given 
that instruction are, predictably, twice as likely to think about the bear as those 
who aren’t given that instruction.”117  Juries given an instruction to only think 
about the song in the context of access, and not in the context of substantial 
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similarity, are twice as likely to think about whether the songs are substantially 
similar.118 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, in his article Judging Similarity, writes that 
“[a]lthough the similarity finding is meant to involve no more than a 
comparison of the two works to assess whether they are sufficiently similar to 
render the copying problematic (i.e., improper), that judgment may be affected 
by the variability of this other evidence.”119  That precisely is the problem he 
argues: “Copyright law . . . seems to assume that the question of substantial 
similarity can continue to remain a simple comparison of the two works, even 
in the face of extensive factual evidence that bears directly on the dispute in 
question.”120  Society presumes that juries are able to “cabin and exclude from 
the analysis all of the evidence with which the court has been presented in the 
lead-up to the issue of substantial similarity.”121  However, as Dr. Broda-
Bahm’s article and our common sense will tell us, this is simply not the case. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, with its holding, created a problem in relation to 
the deposit copy with the admission of the Taurus recording for the limited 
purpose of access.  Juries, although instructed to refer only to the deposit copy, 
will not be able to unhear the sound recording, and if they hear a recording and 
decide that it is substantially similar, then the deposit copy might make no 
difference.  A jury could decide to disregard a deposit copy all together or 
simply fit their interpretation of the recording into the deposit copy. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, as stated earlier, the purpose of copyright law is to promote 
“the advancement of the arts by incentivizing the creation of new and original 
musical works through various laws of protection, thereby fostering both 
creativity and economic prosperity.”122  This purpose is important to remember 
when dealing with copyright infringement cases.  Courts want to encourage 
creativity and economic prosperity through copyright law.  Skidmore, decided 
by the Ninth Circuit, brings to the forefront issues in copyright law that prohibit 
such creativity and economic prosperity.  The Ninth Circuit should reconsider 
the issue of the deposit copy decided in Skidmore and allow the entire sound 
recording to be considered with regards to the issue of substantial similarity.  
Additionally, not allowing the deposit copy to come into evidence with regards 
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to substantial similarity, but allowing it to come into evidence for a different 
purpose, defeats the purpose of excluding the deposit copy in the first place 
because once a jury hears something, they cannot unhear it.  Thus, in order to 
promote the purpose of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit must change its ruling 
in regard to the limitation of the scope of the copyright from simply the deposit 
copy to the entire musical work. 
